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600 BAO£NHORST 
EXPROPRIATIONS BY VIRTUE OF THE MINERAL AND PETROLEUM 
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT: ARE THERE SOME MORE TREES 
IN THE FOREST?' 
Agri South Ajl-ica and Van Rooyen v Minister of Minewls and Energy cases no 
55896/2007 and 10235/2008 (NGP) {unreported 06-03-2009) 
''Some" agrarians arc starting to d1ip away tht: pillar:; ofth~ bridge:. 
The custodians art' trying to rnaintain thO" a~dilitian bridge:··· 
Introd11CI ion 
At issue in this decision was (a) whether it was possible for holders of "unused old 
order rights" to prove that their rights had been expropriated by the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act :28 of2002~ and (b) what procedure is to be 
followed by an expropriatee in order to enforce payment of compensation in a court 
of law. 
• I wish to acknowledge th~ cornrnent:; and $Uggestions of Ernie van der Vyvcr. !, however, r<!!main 
responsiblr: tor the correctness oft he end product. 
·• From the sketch of the "bridge on the river kwaito" in 2002 Obiter 250 280. 
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Prior to r January 1992 the basic policy regarding the exploitation of the min-
erai resources of South Africa was between the two absolutes of complete state 
monopoly and unfettered private enterprise (Franklin and Kaplan The Milti11g and 
Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 1). On i January 1992 the right ofprospect-
ing for natura[ oil and the right of mining for and di;;posing of natural oil, precious 
minerats and precious stones, which were reserved to the state in pre~Union ~nd 
Union mining laws, were revested in the common law holders of mineral rights {s 
5(1) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991). This shift in policy was construed as a form of 
privatisation of minerai rights (Badenhorst •·tne revesting of state· held entitlements 
to exploit minerals in South Africa: privatisation or deregulation?'' 1991 TSAR 113). 
The compensation payable for expropriation of a mineral right in terms of the Fxft 
propdation Act 63 of 1975 was also amended on 1 May 1991 to make specific pro-
vision for payment of compensation of market value of a registered miner~! right 
and actual financial loss caused by the expropriation (s 11(a) of the Expropriation 
Amendment Act 45 of 1991). 
That redistributive reform of the South African mineral Jaw system would lead to 
some form of expropriation has always been foreseen. (See Badenhorst, Vander Vy-
ver and Van Heerden "Proposed nationalisations ofmineral rights in South Africa" 
1994 Journal of Energy and Natwal Resources Law 287.) Act 28 of 2002 not only 
created a new mineral law order but also made provision for a transition by hofders 
of rights to minerals from the old order to the new order. (See Badenhorst''Transi-
tional arrangements in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act 28 of2002: crossing a narrow bridge?'' 2002 Obiter 250.) The expropriation of 
holders of so-called "old order rights'~ due to the transitional measures has already 
occurred, and the constitutionality ofthese measures have been investigated before. 
(See Badenhorst and Moster! ''Revisiting the transitional arrangements ofthe Min-
eral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of2001 and the conslitutional 
property clause: an analysis in two parts'·. 2003 Stell LR 377 and 2004 Stell LR 22; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law ofSouth Africa (2004} 25-19 
et seq.) 
In his analysis of the property clause, Vander Walt (Consfiflltional Property Law 
(2006) 370 et seq) also describes Act 28 of 2002 as an exam pie of the reform in it i a-
tives of the government. Vander Walt's commentary focuses on the extent to which 
the act compHes with the reform objectives ofthe government in terms of the con-
stitution. [n his e~amination of the impact of the new dispensation on existing rights 
to minerals, he draws a distinction between the ••targer issue" of the importance 
of large-scale reform of mineral law and the ''smaller individual issues'' as to how 
individuals are affected. His argument is that criticism of the new system should 
not focus on individual injustice and that criticism about individual injustice should 
not lead to a rejection of systemic reform (384-392). On a metaphorical level Van 
der Walt's analysis was seen as one which focuses on the forest rather than !he trees 
within the forest (Badenhorst and Mostert "Artike! 3(1) en (2) van die Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 van 2002: 'n herbeskouing)' 2007 TSAR 
469 487). Whereas it is agreed that. systemically, the purpose and objectives of Act. 
28 of 2002 are acceptable, the opinion was expressed that future scrutiny ofthe act 
will focus instead on the metaphorical trees (individua( instances) rather than the 
forest (the system) (2007 TSAR 490). 
The focus by the court in the Agri SA decision on one ofthe trees rather than the 
forest is to be welcomed. 
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2 Facts 
The plaintiffs, Agri South Africa and Van Rooyen, were holders of coat and clay 
rights, respectively, over properties prior to the commencement of the act on i May 
1004. (Due to the similarity of their particulars of claim and identical exceptions 
thereto both cases were decided together by the comt.) The plaintiffs claimed that 
their mineral rights were expropriated in terms of section 5 of the act read·with sec· 
tions 2, 3 and 4 and that they were entitled to compensation as contemplated in item 
12 of the transitional arrangements in schedule II ofthe act. The claims were'Iodged 
with the regional manager in terms of regulation 82A(l) ofthe act. The director-gen-
eral determined in terms of regulation 82A(4) that the plaintiffs did not have valid 
claims for compensation. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision of the director-
general to the minister of minerals and energy. By virtue of regulation 82A(6A)(a) 
read with regulation 82A(7) the plaintiffs applied to court in terms of section 14 of 
the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 for the determination of compensation to which 
they are entitled as a result of the expropriation. (See par 1, 2 and 3.) Based upon the 
open market value of coal rights Agri SA claimed R750 000 as compensation (par 
2). Van Rooyen in turn claimed to be entitled to R600 000 for the clay rights (par 3). 
The defendants excepted to their claims as being vague and embarrassing and that 
in any event ex facie the particulars of claim they had not exhausted their internal 
remedies and were accordingly barred from instituting action against the defend-
ant (par 1). The first exception was that the provisions in the act relied upon by the 
plaint1ffs do not provide for compensation of the plaintiff's rights and !hat insuf-
ficient facts had been alleged to apprise the defendant of exactly what the plaintiffs' 
claims were, thus rendering the particulars of claim vague and embarrassing (par 
4). The second exception was based on the plaintiff's statement that they did not ap-
peal against the decision of the director-general of Ehe department of minerals and 
energy determining that they do no have valid claims. The argument was that they 
failed to exhaust their internal remedies in terms ofthe act (par 4). 
3 Decision 
According to Hartzenberg J, section 25 of the constitution of 1996 is the starting 
point of the exercise (par 5}. ln essence. section 25 provides that no one may be 
deprived of property arbitrarily and otherwise than in terms of a law of general 
application. Expropriation has to be for public purposes or in the public interest. Ex-
propriation is subject to compensation, the amount whereof and the mode and time 
of payment, if not agreed upon by the parties. to be determined by a court of law 
The amount of compensation has to be just and equitable taking into account, inter 
alia, the market value of the land and the principle that property is not limited to 
land. The commitment to land reforms and reforms to bring abottt equitable access 
to natural resources was also mentioned by the court (par 6). 
In order to decide the legal issues identified above. the following modus operandi 
was stated by Hartzenberg J: 
"It will be necessary to compare the rights of mineral right holders before 1 May 2004 with their 
rights, as regul~11:d by the Ad, thereafter, and to investigate whether the Act did not expropriate 
vested rights. I fthe answer is positive it is to be ascertained whether provision has been made for 
the payment of compens~tion by th~ expropriator. If the answer to that question is also positive the 
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fu rthcr enquiry is what procedure is to be followed by an expropriatee in mder to en force payment 
of compensation in a court of law'' I par S ). 
3 .l Expropriation 
As to the first question, the court held that expropriation of mineral rights of the 
holders of"unused old order rights'' took place upon commencement of Act 28 of 
2002 (see par 17). As will be indicated, the question of whether expropriation of 
rights of the holder of mineral rights had taken place upon commencement of the 
act is answered by application of a before-and-after analysis. For purposes of the 
determination of the quantum of compensation to be paid, regulation 82A(3) re-
quires that the claimant must indicate the difference 1n nature and content between 
the expropriated property and the "old order rights" which have been preserved or 
the rights acquired in terms of the act. (As to earlier examples of the application of a 
"before and after" comparison of "old order rights" and new rights, see Badenhorst 
2002 Obiter 275-278; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 396-399.) 
The following features of mineral rights prior to l May 2004 were identified by 
the court or inferred from its citation of dicta from case law: 
(a) mineral rights either formed part of ownership of land or could be separated 
from ownership of land; 
(b) mineral rights could be vested in someone other than the owner of land; 
(c) mjneral rights were freely transferable and capable of passing to the heirs of 
the mineral r1ght holder; 
(d) mineral rights were real rights, namely quasi-servitudes; 
(e) a holder of a mineral right was entitled to go upon the property to which the 
right relates, prospect for minerals, and mine and remove the minerals; 
(f) unsevered minerals remained the property of the owner of land until sever-
ance of the minerals from the land by the mineral right holder; 
(g) in the case of irreconcilable conflict between the exercise of a mineral right 
and ownership of hmd, the interest of the latter is subordinated to the interest 
of the mineral right holder; 
(h) the holder of a mineral right was under no duty to exploit the mineral rights, 
even if exploitation would be for the public benefit; 
(i) if unable to exploit mineral rights, the holder could sell it to, for instance, a 
mining house or others for handsome amounts; 
CD mineral rights were valuable assets having a commercial value; and 
(k) mineral rights could further be fragmented into shares, prospecting rights or 
mining rights to particular minerals (see par 7-9). 
In the after-analysis part, sections 2 to 5 of the act and the ''transitional arrange-
ments" contained in schedule ll of the act were taken into account. According to 
Hartzenberg J these four sections of the act did not acknowledge any existing hold-
ing of mineral rights: .. [nsofar as they have not been exploited they simply disappear 
in thin air" (pat 11). In terms of section 4 of the act the only way to acquire new 
rights was to obtain them from the state. Therefore, the court was ofthe view that 
it would have been futile to acquire an unused old order right that existed before l 
May 2004 and use it as a launch pad to acquire rights in terms of the act (par 11). 
The effect of these provisions of the act would have been to extinguish old order 
rights. Such expropriation would have taken place without provision for compensa-
tion. That would have been in conflict with section 25 of the constitution and would 
have rendered the act unconstitutional (see par 11 ). 
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The transitional arrangement, however, needs to be taken into account because it 
gives rights to holders of "old order rights'', and in particular to ho1ders of "unused 
old order rights" (par 1.1). The court found that both plaintiffs were holders of ';un-
used old order rights" (par 12). Hartzenberg J was of the view that schedule II saves 
the act from being declared unconstitutional (par 12). The court, therefore, regarded 
an analysis of schedule II necessary to see what rights are conferred on the holder of 
•·unused old order rights''. Item 8 of schedule II deals with the processing of''unused 
old order rights". An "unused old order right" remains valid for not longer than one 
year from commencement of the act. The holder has the exclusive right to apply for 
a prospecting right in terms of section 16 and a mining right in terms of section 22 
of the act. The "unused old order right" remains va1id until the application is granted 
or refused. Unless an appJication for a prospecting right or a mining right is brought 
the "unused old order right" ceases to exist after the one year period (par 14). 
The court indicated that the legal position of the holder of an «unused old order 
right" had been changed drastically by the act. The holder, who previously was 
under no duty to expfoit minerals, had only one year within which to bring an ap-
plication for a prospecting right or a mining right (par 14). Such an application is 
not a mere formality due to some of the requirements that have to be met in order 
to be successful: 
(a) Payment of a non~refundable fee. 
(b) An environmental management plan has to be submitted in the case of the 
application for a prospecting right. An environmental impact assessment has 
to be conducted and an environmental assessment programme and environ-
mental management programme have to be submitted in the case of the ap-
plication for a mining right. This involves studies over a period of time and 
incurring of costs. 
(c) The applicant must have access to financial resources to the satisfaction ofthe 
minister to conduct prospecting operations or mining operations optimally 
(par 15). (As to additional requirements, see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral 
and Petroleum Law of South Africa 15-5 and 15-6 and 16-4 to 16~5.) 
Item 8 of schedule JI is perceived by the court as merely an opportunity to holders 
of affected "unused old order rights'' to mitigate their damages. If the holdef has the 
necessary financial resourcesj like for instance a mining house, the holder can apply 
for the necessary penn ission to exploit the rights (par 17 ). The court pointed out that 
not all holdefs of "unused old order rights" would be in a position to bring such an 
application or would necessarily be successful (par 15). If the holder does not have 
the financial resources the opportunity afforded by the schedule is more apparent 
than real (par 17). Failure by a holder of "unused old order rights" to apply for a 
prospecting right or a mining right is perceived by the court as a defence afforded 
to the minister against a claim for compensation on the basis that the holder acted 
unreasonably by not having obtained similar rights (par 17). It is not something 
which the minister can rely on to maintain that the holder has not been deprived of 
his rights (par 17). 
The court clearly distinguishes between an administrative expropriation in terms 
of section 55( I) oft he act and expropriations in tefms of various provisions of the act 
(par 16). Item L2(l) by necessary implication recognises the latter form of expropri-
ation (par 16). Hartzenberg J held: "What item 12 of the schedule allows a claimant 
to do is to assert that he has been expropriated and to prove it in a court oflaw" (par 
22). The court found that an expropriation in terms of such other provisions of the 
act has taken place in the case ofholders of""unused old order rights" (see par 16). 
TSAR 2009·3 [ISSN 1)257- 11-17] 
ARE THERE SOME MORE TREES !N THE F'ORESP 605 
The court took note that holders of"old order rights" were not formally expropriated 
in terms of section 55(1) of the act {par 16). Apart from the relief afforded by the 
transitional arrangements. the rights of holders of"old order rights" have been ex-
tinguished by the coming into operation of the act and the state is now at liberty and 
obliged to administer those rights (par 16). The court interpreted the act as admit-
ting "that holders will be deprived of their rights and that such deprivation coupled 
with the State's assumption of custody and administration of those rights constitute 
expropriation thereof' (par 17). In terms of section 3( l) and (2) oft he act the state is 
the custodian and administrator of the mineral resources for the benefit of all South 
Africans. The co.urt concluded that it is possible for holders of"old order rights" to 
prove that their rights have been expropriated (par 19). 
3.2 Claim to compensation 
As to the second question, the court held that the act affords holders of"unused old 
order rights" a right to claim compensation. Section 55{:2) and in particular regula-
tion 82A(7) of the act make some of the provisions of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975 applicable to such claims (par 19; for a discussion of these provisions ofthe Ex-
propriation Act, see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South 
Africa 25-34- 25·34B). 
3.3 Procedure 
As to the procedure to be followed to institute a claim. it was argued by the respond-
ent that an administrative decision having been made by the director-general can-
not be ignored and remains vaHd until set aside, bearing in mind that an unlawful 
administrative decision produces valid legal consequences for as long as it is not 
set aside. It was further argued that no person may apply to court for a review of an 
administrahvc decision until that person has exhausted his or her remedies in terms 
of section 96(1) ofthe act {par 20). 
The court indicated that the submission may have been a good one, but for the 
provisions of regulation 82A(6A), which was later introduced into the regulations 
by Government Notice R 1203 of 30 Nov 2006 (par 21; as to the background to reg 
82A, see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Aji'ica 25-
30). The court decided rhat this regulation in fact authorised the following three in-
stances where a claimant may institute action in court without taking further steps: 
(a) If the claimant lodged a claim in terms of regulation 82A{l) and the. director-
general has informed him in terms of regulation 82A(4) that he has no valid 
claim and the claimant has not appealed the decision of the director-general, 
in terms of regulation 82A(5). 
(b) If the claimant having been informed by the director-general that he has no 
valid claim has appealed against the decision to the minister in terms of regu-
lation 82A(5) and section 69 of the act and the minister has confirmed the 
decision. 
(c) If the claimant's claim has been recognised by the d1rector~general or by the 
minister. on appeal to him or her, and no agreement as to the amount of com~ 
pensation could be reached within 180 days. The court indicated that regu-
lation 81A(6){b) specifically provides that in the absence of agreement the 
amount is to be determined by court (par 21). 
The court found that the cases of the plaintiffs fell directly within the ambit ofreguw 
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iation 82A(6A)(a) (par ~1). According to the court, if regulation 82A(6A) had not 
been introduced into the act's regulations, the fact that a claimant did not have direct 
access to court, and first had to exhaust administrative remedies, may have jeop~rd­
ised the constitutionality of the act (par ~:?.). The court held that the right of appeal 
is the review of an administrative decisio1L The court explained that if the appeal is 
upheld by the minister, the minister's decision is also an administrative decision. If 
an application is brought in terrn5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 against the minister's decision the application is still an applic.ation for the 
review of on administrative decision {par 2:2). 
4 Summa~:v 
The dghls of holders of''unused old order rights" .are expropriated by the provisions 
of sections 2 to 5 ofthe act which extinguishes these righls. Item 8 ofthe transitional 
arrangements in terms of schedule H or Act 28 of 2001 provides an opportunity to 
an !!:xpropriatee to mitigate damage caused by expropriation by applying for a pros-
pecting right or mining right. Failure to mitigate damage in terms of item 8 does not 
change the deprivations of mineral rights that has ta'kcn place. It merely affords the 
min istcr a dt: fence against a claim for compensation on the basis that the holder acted 
unreasonably by not having obtained similar rights. A before-and-after comparison 
of the rights of holders of "unused old order rights'' with their rights as regulated by 
the act on l May 2004 shows that an expropriation had taken place, even with rights 
being granted tn terms of Item 8. Item 12 of schedule H of the act allows a claimant 
to assert [hat he has been expropriated and prove it in a court of law. A clalm tor 
compensation has to be lodged with the director-genera! who must within l2.0 days 
determine whether the claimant has a valid claim or not, and intbrm the claimant 
of his or her determination with written reasons for such determination. A c!airnant 
has the right to appeal against the administrative decision of the director-general to 
the minister. The right of appeal is the review of an administrative decision. The 
claimant doe:-; not first have to exhattst administrative remedies. The c1aimant also 
has the right. not to appeal against the administrative decision. 1 n terms of regulation 
8~A(6A) ofthe act's regulations the c:lai111ant can directly institute action in court if: 
(a) the director-general has informed him that the claim is not valid and no appeal 
llils been made lo the minister; (b) the d irector-generaFs decision that the claim is 
not valid is confirmed upon appeal to the minister: or (c) the claim is. recognised 
by the director-general or the minister as valid but no agreement as to the amount 
of compensation could be reached within 180 days. The constitutionality of the act 
may have been in jeopardy if ·•unused old order rights'' had been extinguished by 
~~ct ions 2 to S of the act without compensation and the claimant did not have direct 
ac<;ess to court to claim compensation for expropriation and first had to exhaust 
administrative remedies. Schedule Il of the ad and regulation 82A(6A) respectively 
save the act in those respects from being declared tmconstitutional. 
5 Discussion 
Tht! court -did not regard it necessary to decide what exactly constitutes expropria-
tion (par 18). What reaiJy happened on 1 May 2004 to "old order rights" still re~ 
quires legal clarification. The relevant date to evaluate whether or not a holder of an 
"'unused old order right'' has suffered any losses and has a claim for compensation 
is 1 May 2004, being the date when the act took c m~ct. That date is also the date of 
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expropriation. [n its exposition of the fat:ts the court states that the p!aintitTs were 
holders of respective m ineml rights until 30 Apri I :?.004 (par 1 ). Not all former hold-
ers. of"old order rights'' will have claims for compensation against the state. In par-
ticular, it should be noted that some holders of''unused old order rights" arc unlikely 
to have suffered any losses and will therefore not have any claim for J,":Ompensation. 
A failure to have applied far a prospecting right or a mining right under the act could 
be a good indication that as at 1 May ~004 the relevant tn!ncral rights had no value. 
Where a person paid for the mineral rights which he held under a separate cession 
ofmineral rights, it is highly likely that he will Sllffcr an actual financial loss due to 
the mineral rights being ex:pwpriated. (For instance, jn the present case Agri South 
Africa was th~ holder of coal rights by virtue of a cession of mineral rights, which 
were acquired on 2 Oct 2001 for an amount ofR! 048 800 (par 2).) 
A slightly different approach. but one that has basically the same result, is to 
consider whether the expropriated rights had :my rnarket value on l May 2004. If 
mineral rights had a market value, the expropriation thereof would have resulted 
in a monetary loss to the holder of such rights and the holder would be entitted to 
compensation. (For instance, in the present case Van Rooyen so1d 20 hectares of the 
clay rights in the property for R I 300 000. whilst the remaining clay rights, worth 
R600 000, were retained (par 3).) Mineral rights have been a commodity which has 
been traded in the open market for many years and the more inform<ltion available 
about the m i neml involved, the more likely it will have a market value, (See in this 
regard Van der Vyver Teoretiese Beskouing van die Bepaling mn die Markwoarde 
van Mineraleregte as 'n Komponenl van die Vergoeding Betaalbaar ing~volge die 
Onteieningswe/63 van 1975 (1986 diss University ofthe Witwatersrand).) 
Apart from the e~propriation identified by the court in the case ofho!clers of"un-
used old order rights~· who did not apply far new prospecting rights or mining rights, 
expropriations in terms of the act could also take place in the case of minerals in the 
following instances: 
(a) if holders of''old order prospecting rights'' or ''old order mining rlghts'' fail to 
apply for conversion to prospecting rights or mining rights within the stipu-
lated periods: 
(b) upon conversion of the <~old order prospeding right'' or "old order mining 
right" and registmtion of a prospecting right or mining right with a lesser 
content; 
{c) upon granting of .a prospect! ng right or a mining right with a les.ser content in 
the c;:~se of an "unused old order right'\ 
(d) upon refusal of an application for a prospecting right or mining right or con-
version to a prospecting rlghl or mining right, by the minister~ 
(e) if, upon the granting of a prospecting right, mining permit or 111 ining right, 
the use ofthc land for the purposes of the conten1 of these rights or permits is 
expropriated from the owner ofthc land; 
(f) when a prospector by virtue of a prospecting contract·( holding a prospecting 
permit) (i) converts the "old order prospecting right"; (ii) fails to do so; or (iii) 
the application for conversion ofthe "old order prospecting right'' is refused, 
the underlying mineral right is expropriated; 
(g) when a lessee by virtue of a mineral lease (holding a mining authorisatjon) (i), 
converts the ~'old order mining right" into a mining right; (ii) fai Is to do so; or 
(iii} the application for conversion of the ''old order mining right'' is refused, 
the underlying mineral right is expropriated ; and 
(h) if holders of mineral rights or other dghts were excluded on 1 May 2004 from 
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the transitional provisions in the sense that they did not become holders of 
"old order rights". {See Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy "Mineral and petro· 
leum" XVII LAWSA re (2007} par 68.) 
These instances need to be examined by the courts. 
6 Conclusion 
The court bravely ventured into the metaphorical forest of expropriation in relation 
to Act 28 of 200:2 and clearly identified the loss of holders of "ttnused old rights" 
as an important instance of expropriation, the right to da]m compensation and the 
procedure that needs to be followed with expropriation. Wnat exactly happened on 
i May 2004 to "old order rights" still requires legal clarification. Determining com-
pensation for such expropriations and identification of other instances of expropria-
tion by virtue of Act 28 of2002 by the courts are expected in future. An interesting 
new chapter in transition to the new mineral law order has started . 
Erratum 
. · PJ BADENHORST 
· Deakin University 
ML Vessio (sien 2009 TSAR 274) bevestig dat sy nie 'n kandidaat nie maar •n 
toegeJate prokureur van die firma MLV te Centurion is. Die redaksie betreur enige 
ongeriefweens die nalate van die outeur om haar besonderhede vollcdig te verskaf. 
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